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   * * * 
MR. CRAGG:  Welcome to our second panel at 
the Fordham Conference.  This panel is about 
understanding network effects in a platform context, 
and we have both Europeans and Americans who will be 
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speaking with us today.  Our speakers are:  
Evan Chesler, the Chairman of Cravath, Swaine 
& Moore, is probably well known to many of you as 
someone who argued the American Express case before 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
We also have Kai-Uwe Kühn, who is a 
professor of economics, an academic affiliate at The 
Brattle Group, and has been at the Commission and 
worked with a number of different universities with a 
focus on high-tech and network-oriented industries 
over the years. 
We also have Romy Abrantes-Metz, who just 
joined The Brattle Group.  She started her career 
working in government and since then she has taught 
and has been publishing in the area of network effects 
and financial markets and is a well-known testifier in 
the area. 
Finally, from Europe we have the head of 
Latham’s Brussels office, Lars Kjølbye.  Lars has a 
distinguished career, having spent the better part of 
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a decade with the Commission in various jobs in 
Europe, then going  into private practice after that, 
where he specializes in the topic that we have at hand 
today. 
Thank you to everybody who is going to be 
speaking today. 
We are going to talk about a couple of 
different topics.  We are going to talk a little bit 
about the existing law, just to set the table here; 
then have the economists talk a little bit about 
network effects; and then we are going to switch over 
to talk about a couple of cases and a couple of topics 
which are live today. 
I will ask Lars and Evan to tee this up for 
us.  I think there is a sense that because of network 
effects there is going to be a general inclination to 
look to the law that defines single-brand markets.  I 
am curious what you think, from both an American 
perspective as well as a European perspective, about 
whether that observation is right and what it might 
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mean. 
MR. CHESLER:  From the U.S. perspective, the 
network effects issue often, of course, is accompanied 
by issues of lock-in, and that immediately causes 
people like me to think about single-brand markets and 
whether they are applicable or not.   
In the United States, the law in that area 
was defined and set almost thirty years ago by the 
Kodak decision in the Supreme Court, and frankly there 
has not been a lot of evolution on the subject since 
then.  There have been some lower court cases, but 
they have attempted to add more granularity or color 
to the Kodak principles of information costs and 
switching costs. 
The challenge in applying that law to 
technology-based markets in the current environment is 
substantial because the questions about switching — 
for example, information costs — are often affected by 
modalities like multihoming.  The law really has not 
yet adapted to those new technological facts, so you 
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find lawyers like me trying to fit the new technology 
facts into the thirty-year-old buckets defined by the 
Supreme Court, and that is not always an easy fit. 
I think what will happen in the coming years 
is that the new facts that are arising in the context 
of technology-driven platforms and the network effects 
that take place on those platforms is going to cause 
the law on single markets to evolve past Kodak to 
accommodate phenomena like multihoming and how that 
relates to more traditional concepts like information 
costs and switching costs. 
MR. CRAGG:  That makes sense. 
Lars, I am curious what your perspective is 
on this, coming from an obviously different legal 
regime.  
MR. KJØLBYE:  It is actually remarkably 
similar in the sense that the single-brand market 
cases that we have had are also pretty dated.  They 
have all involved, like Kodak, aftermarket situations 
where the question was: “Is there a distinct 
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aftermarket for services or consumables? Like Kodak, 
we had cases involving printers and photocopiers and 
whether the ink cartridges for those products were in 
a distinct aftermarket.  
The analysis that the Commission applied at 
the time was basically to ask whether the activity in 
question was shielded from competition.   
Then, in the case of the aftermarkets, they 
looked at primary competition and whether that 
constrained the supplier of the ink cartridges in 
those cases.  They basically looked at two things: (1) 
whether purchasers of those products engaged in 
lifecycle pricing; or (2) whether, even if they did 
not, when they considered buying a printer they looked 
at the cost of the consumables and would switch if 
they were too expensive. 
While the cases involved traditional 
industrial products, I think actually the key question 
— namely, whether there is an activity which is 
shielded from competition in some shape or form — 
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actually remains sound. Then one can apply that also 
to more novel situations. 
MR. CRAGG:  I am curious.  Would you then 
say to a young economist who is trying to be helpful 
to you, “Just read these old cases, and you will have 
all that you need to know to be useful to me?” 
MR. KJØLBYE:  I think you need to think 
about how those principles apply to new situations, 
obviously. 
I do think the big question today is whether 
we continue applying traditional antitrust analysis 
and look at competition in markets and consumer 
welfare or we start applying broader concepts of 
fairness.  You look at app stores, and the key 
question you ask is: Is there a problem with app store 
terms, and to assess that you look at whether the app 
developers can go somewhere else; or do you basically 
look at those terms in isolation to assess whether 
they are fair and reasonable?   
From my perspective, unfortunately — we will 
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come back to that later when we talk about regulation 
— there is a tendency to look at the platform in 
isolation and ask the question: “Are these terms fair 
and reasonable?” 
MR. CRAGG:  I know that Evan’s colleagues 
are up to their eyeballs in this topic, so he may 
share some insight from that in a little while. 
Let me turn to the economics now around what 
you have started to speak about. 
Romy, one of the things that I notice, and 
you may notice also, is that, in general, this term 
“network effects” gets thrown around and it is fairly 
loosely defined.  Some economists have tried to be 
more specific about it.  Do you think it is important 
to be specific, be more careful about defining the 
network effects, or is it something where a loose 
understanding is “good enough” as they say? 
MS. ABRANTES-METZ:  I think this is one of 
the most critical parts of analyzing one of these 
cases, not just for regulation but also for antitrust.  
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As an economist who thinks about modeling network 
effects in the context of what economists call a 
general equilibrium model and try to come up with 
implications for the but-for world and implications of 
potential regulation this is really critical.  I think 
it is easier if I explain this with a couple of 
examples. 
Let’s think about if I may buy a small 
cookie or I may buy a cookie that is four times bigger 
than the smaller cookie but it is otherwise the exact 
same cookie, so I am just getting more of the exact 
same cookie.  That may be good for me if I really like 
cookies, but getting more of the same is the typical 
way that the economic literature has modeled network 
effects.  So the relationship between the size of the 
network and the value of the network tends to be a 
constant scale, whatever that scale is — double, 
triple, etc. 
This does not necessarily apply to all of 
the cases.  For the conversation that we are having 
 10 
 
 
 
 
today, and even with respect to the recent proposed 
steps by the House that came out yesterday, let me 
give the example of how modeling this is wrong in 
other contexts and the implications it may have for 
breaking up companies, for example. 
When you have  a cellphone company that has 
lots of subscribers, think about the value of the 
network as the number of bilateral calls that can be 
made.  If we have one person in, there are no calls; 
if we have two people in, we have one call; if we have 
three people in, we have three calls; if we have four 
people in, we have six calls; if we have five people 
in, we have ten calls; if we have six people in, we 
have fifteen calls. 
What is my point here?  In each one of these 
I am adding one person, yet the value of the platform 
measured by the number of bilateral conversations is 
explosively growing.  Of course, this is a very 
extreme example.  Not all network effects are this 
strong — this is how I have characterized strong 
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network effects — but it has important implications.   
If we think about breaking this platform of 
six that produces fifteen conversations into two 
platforms of three each — not overlapping and not 
connecting with each other — then the two platforms of 
three, which are the same size as the original big 
platform, only produce six conversations rather than 
fifteen.  Why?  Because we are losing all the value of 
the externality of the strong network effect. 
Thinking that this scale may well not be 
constant depending on the size of the network, the 
relationship between the size of the network and the 
value of the network may change with the size of the 
network.  This is critical for regulation, but it is 
also critical when you think about competition, when 
you think about what the critical mass is, how many 
platforms may we expect to exist.  Do we have just a 
few?  Do we have a lot?  Are they big?  Are they 
small?  What is the value of multihoming depending on 
the strength of the network effect?  All of these are 
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really important. 
The more recent economic literature, 
including some of my own and others, is trying to 
focus more on modeling network effects in this 
context, and the implications for regulation are very 
important. 
MR. CRAGG:  Thanks, Romy.  That is quite 
helpful. 
I am wondering, Kai-Uwe, in terms of this 
question about multihoming that Romy just raised, and, 
in terms of that network example, presumably, even if 
you had two networks and everybody was multihoming, 
you would still have the benefits of going from five 
people to six people because they can share bilateral 
calls across the two platforms because they can 
multihome.   
Could you tell us a little bit about how 
important this concept of multihoming is and whether 
there is a single economic insight that you draw from 
it or whether it is a function of market structure? 
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PROF. KÜHN:  I am not sure whether it is a 
function of market structure. 
I think there are two things that are 
important about it.  One of them is why are we at all 
concerned about multihoming, and I think that comes 
back to the discussion of single brands that we have 
heard on the legal side.  The second one is why would 
we look at multihoming in the network context as 
something for analyzing markets or trying to identify 
problems. 
The first question is: Why are we at all 
concerned about multihoming, given that normally with 
other products we are not?  Multihoming is something 
about me as a person using different services 
concurrently, basically.   
If I am thinking about buying a car, no one 
would ask the question when analyzing the car market 
whether we are sufficiently multihoming between 
different car brands at the same time.  Basically, I 
buy a car that is a relatively durable good for a 
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longer period of time; and then I buy a new one, and I 
might actually switch, and it might not matter all 
that much which brand I was buying before.  At least 
it is a situation in which those switching costs do 
not seem to be high enough that we might start 
thinking about every brand of car as its own monopoly 
market.  So the brand market does not come up here. 
But I think what is essential here for my 
own kind of substitutability, if we are thinking that 
these purchase relationships tend to last a very long 
time — so we have long-lived durable goods, in a 
sense, which a lot of the choices we are making, for 
example, about ecosystems seem to be — I actually feel 
I am locked in the next time a choice opportunity 
comes.  I might buy a new computer, but I already know 
in which ecosystem I am going to be because I have 
always used this. 
I think the reason why multihoming has 
become such an important criterion is that we are 
thinking we are in markets in which switching costs 
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are actually relatively high.  I think that is a 
little bit the difference to the old Kodak literature.  
It is not just the aftermarket that you can think of — 
for example, the applications that I have in a certain 
environment of an operating system — but it is also 
that once I have that whole environment of the 
operating system, I might actually switch to something 
else, and then I have to switch devices, I have to 
switch operating systems, I have to switch 
applications, and so on.  So the very large 
complementarity of a lot of different products 
actually leads me into a situation where the switching 
costs are higher. 
Why are we looking at multihoming then?  
Because it is to some extent an indication of whether 
there are these types of problems there.  If I am 
using multiple things at the same time, I can actually 
switch between them without incurring those switching 
costs because my type of behavior is already organized 
around a number of different things. 
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I think we can see that then we can 
differentiate to what extent actually the networks 
effects are all that big.  I think the network effect 
— for example, if you are looking at telecoms — was so 
big because there was a physical network there that 
was connecting us so that you were actually getting 
these economies of scale. 
But when I am thinking about social networks 
and why I am multihoming, it has really — for example, 
with texting — very often been something of a 
coordination between two people where the other person 
told me: “Oh, we are communicating on this, but I like 
this other system.  Why don’t you download it and we 
try it?”  I download it and we try it. 
In that sense, the number of networks that I 
am actually using in this has enormously increased, 
and there is a whole question of whether that is an 
environment in which switching costs really matter or 
whether network effects really matter, because I can 
be induced to at least partially switch in response to 
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something that someone else does.  The coordination 
problem of changing a whole complementary environment 
is not there to the same extent. 
That may be a bit different when we are 
thinking about apps in a given environment, where for 
me switching that whole environment may be more 
difficult or not.  But even there, we are to some 
extent multihoming between, say, the Apple 
environment, the Windows environment, and the Android 
environment. 
If you are looking at a lot of markets that 
work really well, especially two-sided markets, where 
someone on one side of the market already has a large 
number of people, they just leverage this into the 
other side and then sell to the other side of the 
market.  So some of these networks actually are 
movable. 
I think the question of “can we move, can 
others move; do we go all the way to an Uber model 
where the drivers are multihoming and the users are 
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multihoming?” — those are actually questions where we 
need to look at the markets very individually, and 
that is why these platforms are so different from case 
to case.  It is always very scary that we are now 
trying to use one framework for all of these platforms 
with network effects, which I think does not 
correspond to the reality of these markets. 
MR. CRAGG:  Kai-Uwe, am I right that the 
extent to which you are protected from monopoly power 
in a basic network market relies on you being able to 
switch between networks but for a two-sided market 
that insight actually changes? 
MR. KÜHN:  Yes.  But that is why I said even 
in a two-sided market — we have a lot of two-sided 
markets where you are getting entry — the question is, 
which market are you actually interested in?  I think 
the real competition problems are usually in the 
monetized side of the market, not in the subsidized 
side of the market. 
The point, though, is that in the subsidized 
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side of the market there is actually a lot of 
competition for people.  If you are looking, for 
example, at the Tripadvisor model, they already did 
something that was very popular, and then they said, 
“Hey, we have got all the information to make hotel 
and other bookings,” and managed to enter in that way. 
I think it is the question of whether you 
can separate the network effects on one side and the 
other side and how easy that is, because incremental 
entry into another market when you already have a 
network of a given size on one side of the market can 
be pretty easy, and then you are reducing that problem 
of a two-sided network effect issue.   
So, again, I think there is a difference 
there, but there are enormous economies of scope once 
you have a network effect established already on one 
side. 
MR. CRAGG:  Thank you. 
Evan, going back to the question that we 
started with about what law matters here, and as Kai-
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Uwe and Romy were talking about both multihoming and 
networking effects, three of the biggest cases, 
obviously, that have happened over the last twenty 
years are so involved Microsoft, Netscape, and 
American Express. 
When you are working with your clients, 
especially those who find themselves in a platform 
setting, do you find yourself going back to those 
cases as kind of the hallmark of how you advise them?  
How do you go about developing what is going to 
ultimately matter in terms of a legal case, whether it 
be a merger or a litigation of some sort? 
MR. CHESLER:  The answer is a little bit of 
both, I suppose — that is, relying upon those basic 
bedrock principles in those cases, but also trying to 
anticipate where the law is going to go and where I 
want it to go on behalf of whichever client I happen 
to be representing.   
When we began preparing the defense in the 
American Express case, for example, two-sided markets 
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was a subject entirely focused upon by economists;, 
there were no cases.  People talk about the Times-
Picayune case, but it was kind of a reach to fit that 
into the model of a two-sided market as we were 
thinking about it.   
That was a case where we were looking at 
where we wanted to move the law to come out at the end 
of the day, as opposed to starting with existing legal 
principles and applying the facts of that particular 
case to those principles in advising the client. 
In the case of the Microsoft issues, I 
brought the Netscape case against Microsoft almost 
twenty years ago.  There, there was the U.S. case that 
had recently been decided, which really did move the 
goalposts with respect to considering Section 2 cases.  
That is to say that the traditional unity between the 
conduct at issue and the market in which that conduct 
played out was disrupted by the Microsoft decision.   
This concept of taking actions in one market 
that are intended to maintain or develop or preserve a 
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monopoly in a separate market was a significant 
development that has evolved since the U.S. case, and 
certainly since the time I brought the Netscape case.   
There again you have a new paradigm of 
conduct versus market definition, but the cases are 
slowly expanding that paradigm and developing 
situations in which conduct that does not necessarily 
relate to the market in which the defendant possesses 
power nevertheless can form the basis for an action. 
In some cases, it is moving the law to a 
place that does not yet exist, based often upon the 
economic literature that is ahead of the lawyers and 
ahead of the legal system; and in some cases it is 
taking existing jurisprudence like Microsoft and 
trying to expand it to apply to facts that have not 
been developed yet. 
MR. CRAGG:  Lars, in Europe there is some 
similarity with the Microsoft Media Player case.  
Obviously, one of the biggest differences is the 
limitations on those with monopoly power, what they 
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are actually able to do with that.  If you could 
comment on that, I would be curious how you think of 
that in a platform context where paying for 
externalities is a big piece of the economics here. 
MR. KJØLBYE:  From a European perspective, 
the Microsoft Media Player case was the first big case 
that involved network effects analysis.  Of course, 
the first case was probably also the one where you 
found the most clear-cut examples of a two-sided 
market with strong indirect network effects, because 
the operating system that has the best app environment 
attracts the most users, and the operating system that 
has the most users attracts the most app developers, 
and then you basically get to something which can be a 
very virtuous circle if you control that operating 
system. 
You see that repeated over time later on 
with Android, very much the same thing.  In that case, 
interestingly, the Microsoft smartphone operating 
system, Windows Phone, failed.  Why?  Because they did 
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not have a rich app environment and they could not 
compete.  I think also from a European perspective it 
is a very interesting case. 
Coming back to what Kai-Uwe said, I 
completely agree with you that you need to look at 
this case by case.  Again, Microsoft and the Microsoft 
cases are very, very interesting because since the 
leading case there in 2004 there have been a couple of 
merger cases involving Microsoft that illustrate some 
of the points that Kai-Uwe made, which I think are 
useful just to complement what you said. 
The first one was Microsoft/Skype, where 
Microsoft was acquiring Skype, a consumer 
communications service.  At the time, Skype had a huge 
user base compared to everyone else, about 300 
million.  It was back in the days when people were 
only just starting to hear that there was such a thing 
called WhatsApp, but no one really used it at the 
time, so the big player in town was Skype. 
You might think that a service with that 
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large a user base would be characterized by very 
strong network effects.  But the Commission concluded 
that that was not the case because when you looked 
under the hood, you saw exactly what Kai-Uwe said — 
namely, that you had users that used the service to 
communicate with a very small number of friends and 
family that they knew well, and it was therefore very 
easy for them to persuade their family and friends to 
move to a competing service or use several services 
alongside. 
There were some estimates made at the time 
that the average user’s personal network was about six 
people.  So the 300 million was actually made up of a 
huge number of very small personal networks that you 
could easily persuade to move — or at least persuade 
to multihome — to another service.  It makes Kai-Uwe’s 
point very strongly that you do need to look at the 
specifics of each model to understand the network 
effects. 
I also think your point about Tripadvisor is 
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a very interesting one.  As you said, that is a 
service where you have a two-sided market, and you 
would think, Normally wouldn’t the Microsoft approach 
apply there?  Yet, you see that there were competing 
accommodation and hotel booking platforms that had 
been in the market for quite a while when Tripadvisor 
entered, so apparently the network effects are not so 
strong that they cause markets to tip in favor of one. 
Again, the Microsoft case is a good 
illustration of what can happen, like in telecoms, if 
you have very, very strong network effects, but it 
does not mean that whenever you have a company that 
has a large user base that you have network effects.  
You need to look very carefully at each individual 
model and how it works before you decide whether there 
is a problem or not. 
MR. CRAGG:  Yes, that makes sense.   
One of the things that both you and Evan 
mentioned is the economics literature, in particular 
the importance of the economics literature to the 
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development of the law.  One of the things that is a 
little bit striking about the American Express case is 
it did rely quite heavily on a number of economics 
papers. 
I wonder, Romy and Kai-Uwe, if you could 
perhaps comment on whether those are the right papers 
for us going forward, or is there a new literature 
that is even more relevant?   
Just to set the table there, those papers 
tend to be what economists call “partial equilibrium” 
papers, so they do not look at the market effects; 
they simply look at the actual network owner.  So in 
some ways you might think, Well, those are actually 
the wrong papers to rely on because they are not 
equilibrium papers.   
Maybe both of you could give your 
perspective on that as economists, and then I would be 
curious to hear what Evan and Lars have to follow up 
with. 
MS. ABRANTES-METZ:  The papers they were 
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used in the American Express case addressed the issues 
that were relevant to the American Express case.  
Those may not necessarily be the relevant issues in 
either the same industry or other industries moving 
forward. 
One of the things, aside from the partial 
equilibrium effect that you mentioned, the partial 
equilibrium model, is the fact that these are 
typically the papers used to assess monopoly pricing.  
So if you are looking into a platform case — several 
are already ongoing — where the allegation is that 
there is a monopoly, and  they potentially also 
engaged in some type of illegal conduct — if we think 
about the but-for world, is there still going to be 
just one platform or two large platforms or two large 
platforms and many little platforms, etc.? 
We need to calculate the competitive pricing 
to have an estimate of what is the critical mass.  We 
need to understand how likely entry is to occur and 
whether multihoming would likely also happen. 
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All of these things need to have a different 
kind of modeling, what economists normally call 
general equilibrium models, that take into account the 
interactions of all of the agents within an entire 
system, and that also look into the evolution, the 
dynamics, of how would we have reached the new 
alternative world if we are in the context of 
litigation.   
All of these things are critically dependent 
on the network effects, not only obviously but very 
much so, because very strong network effects make it 
less likely that many competitors, especially many 
smaller competitors, would be able to successfully 
compete.   
I think that a new era of literature is 
coming through in the last several years that is going 
to be better equipped to deal with the issues that I 
think are going to be upcoming in the new cases. 
MR. CRAGG:  Kai-Uwe, do you have some 
thoughts on this question? 
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MR. KÜHN:  I think it is really two things.  
The most important question is the use of economics 
and the economic literature in the application to 
cases.  We have a lot of things where it is coming up 
again — which used to be the case but not so much 
anymore — where we get a lot of example economics.  
You want to get an effect, so you put a couple of 
assumptions together and say, “See, you can generate 
the effect.”  Typically, now competition authorities 
take this and say, “See, we need to do something about 
this.”  That is what I find very dangerous.   
The person who first warned about this in 
terms of applied game theory was John Sutton with a 
nice paper called “Explaining Everything, Explaining 
Nothing?: Game theoretic models in industrial 
economics,” a critique of modern applied game theory, 
which was basically saying if you want to generate an 
outcome and you can find the assumptions to generate 
the outcome.   
But what it taught us, and I think where 
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economics has so much gone into the individual case 
analysis, is that what you need in order to make your 
theory relevant is to make sure that the evidence 
shows that the assumptions actually hold in that 
particular industry. 
I think what we are doing at the moment is 
very generally talk about things like network effects.  
I see this with some concern, for example, in 
enforcement in Germany, where people basically say: 
“Oh, it is a platform with network effects.  Markets 
with network effects lead to tipping.  Given that they 
tip, we cannot allow this merger because it would make 
them stronger, and therefore tipping would occur 
faster.”  That is essentially the argument. 
I think that would be very dangerous because 
we do have some models in which we have multiple 
networks.  There are models that come out with 
tipping, for example, but they are typically very 
homogeneous.  If you have a homogeneous network and 
the main thing you care about is the size of the 
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network, you are going to collapse to zero; it is like 
Bertrand competition with homogeneous goods, and one 
will survive. 
What we are seeing is that success in entry 
in these markets has a lot to do with product 
differentiation.  To the extent that you have 
decreasing returns to network size and have 
possibilities of product differentiation, you may have 
actually much more fragmented markets, but not totally 
fragmented, so the scope that you have and so on — for 
example, in Amazon — may be a sign of the quality of 
the network. 
What comes back is that we have a large 
literature on endogenous market structure that I think 
we have to think about applying to this kind of 
context in order to understand what are actually 
sustainable market structures, especially for 
interventions like trying to break up firms, because 
if these structures are endogenous, we are just going 
to create the same structure afterwards.  Those are 
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the kinds of things we have to think about a little 
bit more.   
It is not that the tools are not there, but 
some of these ideas have not been brought together in 
the context of networks. 
MR. CRAGG:  It does remind me, Kai-Uwe, that 
one of the places where you see enormous innovation 
right now is in the fin-tech space, where they are 
piggybacking on old networks like the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
network or MasterCard’s or Visa’s network, to a lesser 
extent American Express’s network, but all of the 
successful entrants are ones that are going after 
specific submarkets.  They are differentiating 
themselves through their features and through their 
pricing for specific customer needs. 
Evan, you are obviously someone who has made 
very successful use of the economics literature in 
recent years.  Perhaps you could comment a little bit 
on how you think about the American Express case, what 
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the economist papers there stand for, and what doors 
are still open as we go forward in both the law and 
the economics. 
MR. CHESLER:  First, let me say that the 
American Express case was an example, as I said 
before, where the economics were ahead of the law and 
the challenge was to apply the literature in a legal 
context, where it is subjected to cross-examination.  
Although I greatly respect the academic tradition of 
peer review, it is not quite the same thing as a 
courtroom cross-examination.  So it was very 
challenging to bridge that gap, to make that 
conversion. 
To your question about where things go from 
here in the light of American Express, one place that 
is very much an open area to be developed is the 
question of price effects.  In the American Express 
case, that was fairly straightforward, in the sense 
that there was a price charge on the merchant side of 
the market for the services provided to merchants and 
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there was a so-called “negative” price on the consumer 
side in the form of rewards, and a lot of the 
litigation centered on whether the two-sided price had 
ever been determined and if there was any evidence of 
anticompetitive effect. 
But as the American Express two-sided 
precedent, if you will, is applied going forward, one 
of the places that I think is a very interesting place 
where literature is needed is: What do you do when one 
side of the market involves data and a not a 
quantitative commodity that is relatively easily 
subjected to a price analysis?  How do you determine, 
for example, what the two-sided price is when the 
product on one side of a two-sided market is data that 
is not charged for?  How do you then even approach as 
a matter of economics and then translate that economic 
principle into the legal context?  How do you approach 
the question of placing value on both sides of the 
market in order to determine whether there has been an 
anticompetitive price effect?  
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I think that is a place where a lot of 
attention is going to be paid in the legal environment 
and I suspect is being paid and will be paid in the 
context of the literature. 
MR. CRAGG:  Obviously, there is a set of 
class action cases that have gone forward around data 
breaches of exactly the sort that you are speaking to, 
Evan.  They are class action cases, and so the first 
question is how you certify a class.  That goes 
specifically to the question you are asking, Evan: 
What is the value of the data?   
One approach that has been used is to say, 
“Well, we can observe the value of the data in a black 
market.”  I am wondering what you guys think of that 
as a potential solution to Evan’s question about what 
the value of data is.  Is that going to lead to an 
understatement of the value or an overstatement of the 
value? 
MR. KÜHN:  I think it is really the question 
of “What data?”  A lot of people would be thinking, 
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Oh, you have a zero price; therefore you are paying 
with your data.  I think that is wrong because the 
two-sided market models tell you that you get a zero 
price for other reasons than you giving something up, 
which would be data. 
But I also think the value of data to one 
side of the market is very different from potentially 
the value of data to another.   
It may actually also not be the same 
product.  If a platform company sells its data — to 
the extent that they do; very often they do not — but 
to the extent that they do, that is already a 
structured data set that they have collected and had 
to prepare, so there is a different type of product in 
that that is actually being sold. 
For me, asking that question in terms of 
“What is this other product as a price on the zero 
side of a market?” is also problematic because the 
issue is not so much “What is the value to me of 
retaining the data?” but it is the value to me of 
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avoiding an externality, that I might actually not 
even know what the size is.   
I think we might come back to that 
discussion.  I think that is much more problematic 
because the damage might actually be in a use of the 
data that was not even intended by the platform that 
is the other side of my transaction but might come up 
somewhere later in that chain of the data being used 
and being passed on. 
I think the problem is even worse than 
saying, “There is no price for that.”  Otherwise, you 
would say, “Oh, let’s just introduce prices and it is 
all good.”  I think there is a far deeper problem that 
comes from the measurement of what external effects 
could be on me from data being transferred from 
someone else and being used. 
That is not a solution to the problem, but I 
think the problem is deeper than just asking the 
question of “What is the value of data to you?” 
MR. CRAGG:  Lars, you mentioned the 
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Nokia/Microsoft case earlier.  When you look at the 
cases that have actually played themselves through 
into a regulatory setting or into a legal setting, it 
is quite striking how long that plays itself out.  As 
we know from yesterday’s congressional report, for 
instance, there is a great focus on the handful of 
networks that have succeeded. 
Do you think there is an overemphasis on the 
successful networks, that as you look back at history, 
there is either a little bit of evidence or a lot of 
evidence that says that some of the concerns about 
networks are actually overstated and that Jeff Bezos 
might be more right than we think when he says that 
before he dies his monopoly is going to go away — 
although he does not, I think, use the word 
“monopoly.” 
MR. KJØLBYE:  I think there is some of that.  
If you look back in time, you could say that the 
enforcers and the political establishment have been 
used to having one very large and powerful tech 
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company around.  You started off with, say, IBM, then 
you had Microsoft, and then you had Google.  I think 
the concern is that at the same time you have now 
several large companies and the economy is seen to be 
in transformation and digitization is spreading across 
the entire economy. 
Therefore, I think you get a bit the same 
concerns that you had with Microsoft and Windows, that 
people are saying, “Well, if Microsoft can integrate 
features into Windows without any limitation, where 
does it end?”   
Now we are seeing that with several large 
platforms in parallel, where you would say, “Well, if 
there are no limits to how much each of these or 
collectively they can spread, they end up being 
involved in a large share of the entire economy.” 
If you look at it from a European 
perspective, for instance, the car industry is one of 
the remaining strongholds of European business, and 
there is clearly a lot of concern about what happens 
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if Google or Apple get into the car and control the 
value of the car.  I think what you see now is a 
reaction to fear of the unknown, rather than 
necessarily having sat down and rationally looked at 
what the magnitude of the problem is, if any.  So I 
think there is some of that. 
MR. CRAGG:  Yes.  I am conscious of time.  
We have just a couple of minutes left here, so I will 
just make a couple of observations about our panel. 
First, I would like to thank them.  It is 
very interesting to me.  We had a preparatory meeting 
earlier this week or last week, which was equally 
engaging.  We could have gone on for hours, I think.   
What is quite interesting about that is that 
the conversation we had today is not a mirror image of 
that conversation; it is quite a different 
conversation.  I think the takeaway is, as our experts 
are identifying for us here, that these issues require 
detailed and careful examination, that it is very much 
not a “one size fits all,” and the jurisdictions are 
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going to matter a lot. 
The other thing that I would take away from 
this is what Lars is I think pointing to, which is 
that when you look back it creates a fear of the 
unknown.  But if you put yourself at the turn of the 
century, I think very few people would have predicted 
that you would be witnessing essentially a battle of 
titans, for instance, between Epic and Apple in the 
way that they are now. 
I would just note that when you look at 
where software markets are evolving and where 
technology markets are evolving, there are a couple of 
things which I think are worth pointing to.   
One is obviously cloud computing is a major 
game changer; it is going to change the way we 
interface with our data and the devices that we use to 
do that.  The other game changer is the transition to 
5G and ultimately what that is going to mean for the 
backbone and the last mile and how we think about the 
relationship between hardware and software. 
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The last thing I would have people think 
about is, for those of you who have been involved in 
venture capital, IPO-stage companies, one of the 
things you will notice is that the hottest part of the 
market right now is the software-as-a-service model, 
which is a transformation of where we were previously.  
The other transformation of where we were previously 
is the idea of premium software.   
As I look forward and ask the question “Do 
those past cases give us insight?” — I would say the 
cases involve both the economics and the law — “does 
it foreshadow where we are headed?”  I would say that 
it does not really provide us a strong grounding from 
a regulatory perspective. 
Prior to the conversations I had with this 
crew, I am not sure I would have held those 
perspectives in the way I do now. 
I just want to say thank you to our 
panelists and thank you to our audience.  Bye, 
everybody. 
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   * * * 
   Closing Remarks 
MR. KEYTE:  Thanks, everyone, for a first 
very full day of the Fordham Competition Law Institute 
Workshops.   
Thank you to Edgeworth and Brattle for some 
incredibly in-depth economic analysis, which is what 
we have always been trying to achieve with the 
Economic Workshops.   
Thanks also to our Heads of Authority panel.  
It is very interesting to get such a broad 
perspective, and we will try to figure out how to do 
that again even when we are live. 
Tomorrow, of course, is a very full day with 
a networking breakfast.  Please attend those.  We will 
work out the kinks on the Remo platform this 
afternoon.  That is with Skadden and Clifford Chance 
and in the afternoon with Freshfields. 
Then, of course, we have Executive Vice 
President Vestager and Assistant Attorney General 
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Delrahim, a tech panel, a mergers panel, and a 
Fireside Chat with Barry Hawk and Bill Kovacic. 
We will see you all tomorrow.  Be ready for 
a full day.  There will be opportunities for questions 
from the audience in all of the panels as well. 
Thank you very much. 
 
 
